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NOTES.
ARREST-NECESSITY OF
\AIMRANT-V'IOLATION OF SUNDAY
LAw-The right of a private citizen, or an officer of the law, to
make an arrest without a warrant, depends primarily upon the
nature of the offense for which the arrest is made. The general
common-law rule is that a )rivate person without a warrant may
make a lawful arrest only when a felony
has actually been cornUnder the old English common law, a felony was any species of crime
which occasioned the total forfeiture of land and goods of the guilty party.
E parte Wilson. 114 U. S. 417 (1884).
But this definition is not applicable
in the United States, because Article j, Section 12. of the Federal Constitution provides that "no conviction shall work corruption of the blood or
forfeiture of estate." Therefore, the determination of what constitutes a
(474)
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mitted, and he has reasonable grounds, within his own knowledge,
to believe that the party arrested is the guilty party.2 A strong
suspicion that a felony has been committed is not enough to justify

an arrest without a warrant by a private person, if the actual
commission thereof cannot be proved by the party making the arrest.3 If a felony has actually been committed, a private person is
justified in arresting one whom he has reasonable grounds to
believe to be guilty thereof, though it should subsequently develop
that the party arrested was innocent.' Apparently the only exception to this general rule is that under a "hue and cry" a private
person may arrest the pursued party without any liability therefor,
although no felony has in fact been committed.' A private person
may also arrest for a breach of the peace 6 committed in his presence, 7 or to prevent the continuation of a breach of the peace
which has temporarily stopped. but which is likely to be resumed 6
The general rule respecting an officer of the law is that he
may arrest without a warrant, when he has reasonable grounds
to believe that the party arrested has committed a felony;' and
if the grounds for his belief are reasonable, he is justified in making
the arrest although no crime of any sort has in fact been committed." An officer may also arrest without a warrant one who
commits a breach of the peace in his presence."
The right of an officer, without a warrant, to arrest for a
misdemeanor which is not a breach of the peace, depends upon
felony in the United States must depend upon the wording of the statutes
of the various States. Yn Massachusetts a felony has been defined as a
crime which is punishable by death, or imprisonment in the State penitentiary. Rev. Laws of Mass., Chap. 215, Sec. Y. See also Wilson v. State,
x Wis. 184 (1853).
'Halley v. Mix. 3 Wend. 351 (N. Y. i8.); Brooks v. Com., 6r Pa.
St. 3.32 (i869) ; Ashley's Case, 12 Coke go (Eng. i6io).
3Farnum v. Feeley, 56 N. Y. 451 (1874); Wakely v. Hart, 6 Binn. 316
(Pa. 1814); McCarthy v. De Armitt, 99 Pa. St. 63 (Y88i).
' Brockway v. Crawford, 48 N. C. 433 (x856) ; Wilson v. State, ii Lea
31o (Tenn. 1833).
"People v. Lillard, 18 Cal. App. 343 (1912).
'A breach of the peace may be defined as a violation of public order
or an act of public indecorum. Bouvier's Law Dictionary (Breach of Peace);
Calvin v. State, 46 Tenn. 283 (1869).
'Com. v. McNall. r Woodw. 423 (Pa. i868); State v. Campbell, 1o7
N. C. 948 (89o); Price v. Seeley, io Cl. and F. 28 (Eng. 1843).
'Ingle v. Bell. r M. and W. 5T6 (Eng. z836).
'Chandler v. Rutherford, TOT Fed. Rep. 774 (9oo) ; CoM. v. Phelps, 209
.Mass. 396 (191r); Filer v. Smith, 96 Mich. 347 (1893).
"Kirk v. Garrett. 84 Md. 383 (Y896): Com. v. Cheney, 141 Mass. 102
(i-6); but see Marsh v. Smith, 49 Ill. 396 (i868); Warner v. Grace,
T4 Minn. 487 (869).
" Veneman v. Jones, 118 Ind. 41 (j888); Com. v. Tobin, io8 Mass. 426
(1871).
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the authority of statute or ordinance. It may be stated as a general rule that to justify an officer without a warrant in making
an arrest for a misdemeanor, it must actually have been committed
in the presence of the officer;'!' and without a warrant, an officer
cannot arrest for a misdemeanor, even though committed in his
presence except by authority of statute, city charter or ordinance."3
In many states, statutes have been enacted providing for the arrest
without a warrant of certain classes of offenders; such as, automobilists who violate the law, persons violating election or liquor
laws, persons unlawfully setting fires, fishing or hunting, persons
spitting in public places, and a great many others. But apparently
there is a tendency on the part of courts to look with disfavor
upon legislative enactments which authorize arrest without war14
rant for misdemeanors not amounting to breaches of the peace,
as encroachments upon the constitutional liberties of the people."S
Accordingly in a recent case it was held that an officer without a
warrant was not justified in arresting a person who was violating
a Sunday law, since the law did not authorize the arrest of the
offender without a warrant?" In the absence of authority by
statute, an officer without a warrant cannot legally arrest a person
and search him on suspicion or information that he is carrying
concealed weapons."7
Such an arrest and search has been held to
be a violation of the constitutional provision against unreasonable
searches and seizures.' 6
It has been decided that the legislature has power to authorize
an officer to make an arrest without a warrant for a misdemeanor
committed out of the presence of the officer;1" but in such case
an officer arresting for a suspected misdemeanor is protected only
when a misdemeanor has been committed or attempted.20 An
ordinance authorizing the police to arrest without a warrant, all
persons suspected of having committed a misdemeanor is invalid;
and where a warrant is required by existing law, an authority to
arrest without a warrant cannot be implied from a general grant
to a municipality of power to arrest.21
IMarkey v. Griffin, iog T11. App. 212 (19o3).
"Main v. McCarty. iS Ill. 44t (i854); Roderick v. Whitson, 5t Hun.
6--o (N. Y. 1889); White v. Kent. ix Ohio St. 55o (z86o).
" People v. Haug, 37 N. W. 21 (Mich. x888).
"Jamison v. Gaernett. 1o Bush. 221 (Ky. 1874); but see Butolph v.
Blust, 41 How. Pract. 481 (N. Y. 1871).
"Mazzolini v. Gifford, 98 At). Rep. 9o4 (Vt. 1916).
" Hughes v. State, 2 Ga. App. 29 (1907).
"Pickett v. State, o9 Ga. 12 (i8g6); Hughes v. Com., 19 Ky. Law
Rep. 497 (8).
" Childers v. State, 156 Ala. 96 (7g63).
' Gold v. Armer, 140 N. Y. App. 73 (1910).
Gunderson v. Struebing, 125 Wis. 173 (igo5).
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lut even where a warrant, is required by existing laws in order
to constitute a legal arrest, if there is likely to be a failure of
justice for want of a magistrate to issue a warrant, an officer may
arrest without a warrant:2" and if an officer is informed by a telegrain from the police department of another city that a person
suspected of murder is on a railroad train, such officer may enter
the train, force his way into the berth of the suspect and arrest
him. 2
In some states, an arrest, without a warrant, can be made
only when the offense was committed therein :-4 while in others,
an arrest without a warrant may be made for a felony committed
outside of the state.?'

In those cases where a warrant is necessary in order to effect
a legal arrest, the person making the arrest must actually have
the warrant in his possession at the time of making the arrest. -1
There is no such thing as constructive possession of a warrant, although where a sheriff has a warrant in his possession, his deputy,
while within his sight and hearing. may make an arrest without a
warrant.2 1 Apparently the only substitute for a warrant in those
cases where a warrant is necessary to constitute a legal arrest, is
the oral direction by a magistrate to an officer, where the magistrate would have authority to issue a warrant; and it has been
decided that the oral command of such a magistrate to arrest a
person for an offense committed in his presence is just as binding
upon an officer to whom the command is directed, as a formal
warrant would have been. and is a complete protection to the
officer making the arrest.2 9

E.L.H.
IXTER-,ATIONAL

LAW-NEUTRAL

VF.SSET-COXTT-NUOU'S

'%OY-

ACE-During the present war the English Prize Courts have had
opportunity to reaffirm a comparatively new principle of international law known as the "continuous voyage." This doctrine.
applying to the seizure of contraband by belligerent war vessels,
holds that the ultimate destination of the cargo determines its
It was
liability and not any nominal or intermediate destinatioi.
introduced into international law to meet exigencies during Eng-

'Dixon v. State, 72 Ga. App. 17 (T912).
'Burton v. N. V. C. & TF.R. R. Co, 147 N Y. App. 5,- (19r1).
2 Malcolmson v. Gibbons. 56 Ifich. 459 (j&95); State v. Shelton, -,9
X. C. 6o5 (787).
'Burton v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co.. supra, No. 23; State v. Anderson,
I Hill 327 (S. C. 1833).
' Webb v. State, 5r N . . L 189 (888).
People v. Shanley, 4o Hun. 477 (N. V. 1886).
" People v. McLean, 68 Mich. 480 (M888).
'Forrist v. Leavitt, 52 N. H. 481 (I868).
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land's war with France in 1756, when the latter's commerce had
been destroyed. To continue trade with her possessions France
relaxed her colonial monopoly, by allowing neutral vessels to carry
between the West Indies and her home ports, ostensibly on neutral
account in order to claim immunity from capture. The English
courts, nevertheless, condemned such vessels and their cargoes, the
)rinciple being that "a neutral has no right to deliver a belligerent
from the pressure of his enemy's hostilities, by trading with his
colonies in time of war, in a way that was prohibited in time of
peace." I To evade such condemnation neutral traders began to
ship from a belligerent to a neutral port, thence transhipping to
the final belligerent port. claiming that the ship was thus always
on a voyage between a belligerent and neutral port. Notwithstanding such a stop, the voyage was held by the English to be really
continuous from one hostile port to another, and so both ship and
cargo were condemned.2 Lord Stowell, in The Maria declared
that the "mere touching at any port without importing the cargo
into the common stock of the country, will not alter the nature
of the voyage which continues the same in all respects, and must
be considered as a voyage to the country to which the vessel is
actually going for the purpose of delivering the cargo at the ultimate port." 3 Neutral merchants then adopted the device of actually unloading the cargo at a neutral port and even passing it
through the customs before reshipment.4 At first it was believed
that this came within the law but it was found otherwise in the
case of The lllliam.1 which finally established for England the
principle that nothing can save ship and cargo from condemnation
where both real ternini are proved to be hostile no matter what
happening intervenes.
It must be observed that in the early days under the so-called
Rule of 1756 the doctrine applied to two cases only: Where
neutrals engaged in a belligerent's trade that was prohibited in
times of peace, and where illicit trade was carried on with the
enemy by a belligerent's subjects. It is also noteworthy that vessels and their cargoes were seized only when en route to the final
belligerent port, that is. when on the second stage of the journey.
This new doctrine survived the "temporary emergency which
gave it birth" because it was very properly applicable to situations
of a more enduring nature. During the Civil War our courts had
'James Stephen, War in Disguise. 4th Ed., pp. 12, 13.
'The Immina. 3 C. Robinson j6;. Scott's Cases. 7-6.
'The Maria (8o.). 5 C. Robinson 368. See following pages for review of cases on this subject.
""The Doctrine of Continuous Voyage." by C. Noble Gregory, in the
Twenty-sixth Report of the International Law Association. London. 1910;
p. I2--N.
'5 C. Robinson 385, Scott's Cases, 868 (m8o6).
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occasion to apply it frequently and effectively. But they went
farther and extended it to cases of blockade-running 6 and the
carrying of contraband.; This extension was highly important and
completely logical. The Confederacy sought to nullify the effect
of the Union blockade by the use of blockade-runners which took
on cargoes at West Indian ports. Union war vessels repeatedly
captured ships en route to such ports and they and their cargoes
were condeniiied by our courts. No distinction wras drawn between
blockade-running and those early cases under the Rule of 1756,
where the French ports were not actually closed by the enemy.
Vessels en route from neutral ports or carrying cargoes from such
ports with the intent to break a blockade were held liable to condemnation throughout the voyage. Hence. as in the original cases
under the "continuous voyage" doctrine. no matter at what intermediate port the vessels might stop, the intent to reach a final
belligerent destination once being established, condemnation was
certain.

"The American cases were everywhere frowiled upon and the
new exfension of the doctrine was considered a rule of the United

States and not of international law.

England. however, despite

the fact that her shipping was the principal victim of this new

practice, made practically no effort diplomatically to seek reparation from our government.' Moreover during the Boer'War it

was clearly indicated that so far as contraband was concerned the
British Government accepted the innovation.'
The extension of the doctrine as to blockadc has nowhere
found any favor. In some places it was looked upon with fear
and suspicion. It was first established in the case of -The Springbok.' 0 which was captured en route from England to Nassau with
partly contraband cargo. The court condemned the whole cargo
as guilty of breach of blockade because it was intended for a blockaded port, although the ship's master was unaware of that fact.
This was contra to the general idea that breach of blockade is

primarily an offense of the ship, of the goods only. secondarily as
derived from the ship." However, the American rule would seem
inherently correct when it is considered that after all a ship seeks

a port to land a cargo there, making not it but the ship the in'
cident and so the substantial idea of the law is the reverse of
"The Pearl, i9 Fed. Cases 5
The Dolphinn. 7 Fed. Cases 86&

'Address. supra. note 4. by C. Noble Gregory, on "The Doctrine of the
Continuous Voyage," pp. 125 ff.
' Three German vessels were seized en route to a Portuguese port in
South Africa carrying cargoes thought to be contraband intended for England's enemy.

I's Wallace r (866).
"Westlake, "International Law," Part IL War, 2d Ed. p. 297.
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what the text writers would have it. 1- Despite this fact opposition to the application of the doctrine to blockade continued strong
in all directions and the Declaration of London in i909 repudiated it."3
Nevertheless, it becomes clear that as to contraband some modification of the original law was necessary by reason of the developnient of steam navigation and the consequent alteration of
the conditions of blockade-running and the carrying of supplies.
Unless a change was made a belligerent would not be able to
enjoy the proper protection he once held and would have to suffer
because contraband articles were actually received by the enemy
though ostensibly on the way to neutral ports. In the American
cases there was so evident an attempt to aid the Confederacy in
the shipments of contraband to the \Vest Indies that England
realized the weakness of any position she might take as to the
innocent voyage of her carriers. The. force of circumstances
brought about by. the new conditions of commerce and warfare
demanded a general ratification of the American application of
the continuous voyage doctrine as to contraband and this was
effected in the Declaration of London.
As to absolute contraband it was determined to be immaterial
whether the carriage of goods be direct or entail transhipment or
a subsequent transportation by land so long as it was destined to
enemy territory or the enemy's armed forces.14

Thus the destina-

tion of the goods was made the controlling factor. This provision
directly adopts the holding of the Supreme Court in the Peterhoff
case," ' where goods were held liable to condemnation if contraband no matter what means of transport were adopted.
As to conditional contraband-a class originated by the English to cover such goods whereof the noxious or innocuous character depended on the use to which the enemy applied them 10 the destination of the vessel and not the goods is made the contr' ling factor. Such cargoes are free from capture except when
found on board a vessel bound for territory belonging to or occupied by the enemy or for the armed forces of the enemy and
when they are not discharged at an intervening neutral port.' I An
exception to this is made where the enemy country has no seaSee C. Noble Gregory, supra, note 4, P. I-6.
"Article i9, Declaration of London.
"

"Article .30, ibid
" 5 Wallace 28. Traffic other than contraband. however, was held not to
be any violation of blockade if transhipped by land from the neutral inter-

mediate port to the enemy.
"Lawrence, "Principles of International Law," 5th Ed., p. 7o6.
"*Article 35, Declaration of London.
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board; in such case conditional contraband may be captured in
spite of the neutral destination of the vessel carrying it, if shown
to be on its way to the armed forces or the governmental departffients of the enemy state. 8 Obviously it would be unfair to allow
a belligerent to make a neutral port more useful to it in its war
than a port of its own could be.
Although there is no formal instrument binding as an international convention, the attitude and action of the more important maritime states before and since the time of the International
Naval Conference (09o8-i9o9). indicate that the doctrine of continuous voyage was universally approved as set forth in the
Declaration of London. What was presumably the law when the
Great War began has been followed by England in the case of
The Maracaibo.19 where the principles were fully and correctly
applied. A Danish vessel carrying contraband between neutral
countries was seized under circumstances that clearly showed the
real final destination to be in the enemy's territories. The vessel
and cargo were condemned as though the ostensible destination
were a hostile port. The result achieved under the Declaration of
I.ondon is exactly the same as that reached by our courts in the
Peterhoff and other cases, supra. Hence it appears that what
England wisely refused to condemn at that time as an unauthorized innovation in international law she has since found it imperative to adopt as necessary to her success as a belligerent. In
the Maracaibo case the court has followed the definition of a
"continuous voyage" as announced by the British Government in a
memorandum drawn up for the use of the London Naval Conference:20
"When an adventure includes the carriage of goods
to a neutral port, and thence to an ulterior destination, the doctrine of 'continuous voyage' consists in treating for certain purposes the whole journey as one transportation, with the consequences which Would have attached had there been no interposition
of the neutral port." The court found here that the whole transportation was made in "pursuance of a single mercantile transaction preconceived from the outset." The evidence "went farther
than to show that the goods were sent to the neutral port in the
hopes of finding a market there for delivery elsewhere." England
has fully complied with what was understood before the war as
the law of -nations as to this principle in reference to contraband.
What has since 1756 appeared to be the just and logical rule as
to neutral ships in continuous voyage to belligerent destinations
has been more firmly than ever established in the English ratification of the American extension.
H.D.S.
"Article 36, ibid.
"i ts L. T. Rep. 639 (Dec. ioi6).

Parl. Blue Book. Misc. No. 4 (19o9), pp. 7, 8.
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PROvERTY-OwNERSIIP oF STOCK QUOTATIONs-TCKER SERVjcL-The incidents of the ownership of market quotations of stocks,
bonds and commodities generally are the subject of considerable
dispute. It is settled that such quotations are property, but like
any other sort of literary property, the common-law right to their
sole possession exists only until they are published so as to be
given to the world.' The English law permits printed market
quotations to be copyrighted,2 but the American law has never
gone so far as to grant this privilege to collectors and distributors
of quotations. 3
-However,protection to a certain extent is given
by judicial determination of the principle that mere communication to a subscriber for his own use and that of his customers,
and for the purpose of attracting trade to the subscriber, is not such
a publication as to deprive the owner of his right to exclude others
not authorized by him to receive quotations, from their use.4 Accordingly the courts will restrain the publication or sale of quotations by one who has obtained them surreptitiously from a duly
entitled subscriber or distributor." So far it is clearly determined
that market quotations are a species of property, may be owned
and enjoyed as such, and that the courts will protect the owners
in their use and enjoyment.
But when there arises the question of sale or distribution of
stock quotations to individuals outside of the owners who were
originally entitled, we find the law in an unsatisfactory and unsettled condition. Varying views as to the nature of Stock Exchanges and Boards of Trade, as to the duties of such associations
towards the public generally, and as to the control such bodies
may retain over market quotations \vhen they have sold them or
granted the right to distribute them to others, all add their quota
to the confusion.
The case of Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Foster0 is the
most recent judicial expression on the subject. The New York
'Exchange Tel. Co. v. Gregory, L. R. 1&66,
Q. B. 147; Board of
Trade v. Christie Grain, etc., Co.. 198 U. S. 236 (,o5): Chamber of Commerce v. Wells. ioo Minn. ,o5 (O7): Dodge Co. v. Construction Informa-

tion Co., 183 Mass. 62 (i0o3); Kiernan v. Manhattan Quotation Tel. Co,
5o How. Pr. x94 (N. Y. 1875).
'Exchange Tel. Co. v. Gregory, supro, note x.
3National Tel. News Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 19 Fed. 298,
56 C. C. A. 198 (19o2). Such matter is not the "fruit of intellectual
labor."
'Board of Trade v. Christie Grain. etc., Co., supra, note I; Board of
Trade v. Kinsey, 130 Fed. 15o7, 64 C. C. A. 669 (19o4) ; McDearmott Commission Co. v. Board of Trade. 146 Fed. 961, 77 C. C. A. 479 (1906);
Board of Trade v. Cella Commisgion Co., 145 Fed. L18, 76 C. C. A. 28
(i906).
'Cases cited in note 4.
ax3 N. E. 192, P. U. R. 1916 F, p. x;6 (Mass. i916).

.VOTES

Stock Exchange agreed to collect and tabulate continuous quotations of sales on its floor, and furnieh them to the Telegraph Conpany. The company paid a fixed yearly suni for this, and acquired
the right to distribute these quotations to its patrons, on terms of
its own. The contract with the Stock Exchange provided, how'ever, that all applications to the Telegraph Company for ticker
service should be made in dul)licate on a particular form, one to
be forwarded to the exchange and unless the exchange approved
of the applicant, the company was to refuse Iim service. Foster,
in the city of Boston, applied on the regular forms for ticker service; the exchange refused to approve Foster's application, whereupon the Telegraph Company refused to install a ticker in his
office. Foster then applied to the Massachusetts Public Service
Commission for an order compelling the company to furnish him
the service, which order was duly granted by the commission.
The company appealed to the Supreme Judicial Court. which upheld the order of the commission, and decreed its enforcement. The
court, in an opinion delivered by Mr. Chief justice Rugg, based its
decision on the ground that whatever property right the company
acquired in the quotations was purely incidental to its functions as
a public utility, and as such tinder the Public Utilities Law was
subject to the control and regulation of the commission; that the
company was obliged to serve all applicants for ticker service
without unlawful discrimination; and that the contract between
the Telegraph Company and the Stock Exchange could not be
pleaded in bar of a valid exercise of the police power under the
statute.
The court conceded that the stock exchange was a voluntary
association with the right to dispose of its prol)ertv as it might
see fit. to make its quotations known to some and denied to others.
On this point there is a substantial dispute. A line of cases fol-^
lowing the doctrine of Miinn v. Illinois" holds that the matter of
furnishing quotations by an exchange or board of trade is so impressed with a public interest that discrimination in serving all
those who are willing to pay for service and abide by reasonable
regulations of the exchange, is unlawful."
Even tnder such a
view, no case has gone so far as to hold that the exchange may
Mass. Laws m0x3. Chap. 784, Sec. 2 (c): "The commission shall
. . . have general supervision and r~gulaiion of. and jurisdiction and
control over, the following services, when furnished or rendered for public
u.e within the commonwealth . . . c. The transmission of intelligence
within the commonwealth by electricity, by means of telephone lines or
telegraph lines or any other method or system of communication, including the operation of all conveniences, appliances, instrumentalities, or equipment utilized in connection therewith or appertaining thereto."
'94 U. S. 113 (1876).
,New York, etc.. Exchange v. Board of Trade. 127 111. 153 (839), the
leading case; Western Union Tel. Co. v. State, ib5 Ind. 492 (19o5).
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not withhold its quotations altogether from everyone.' 0 Other
cases prefer the view assented to in Wtestern Union v. Foster."
The court then decides that the transaction between the exchange and the telegraph company was a sale; and the quotations,
therefore, were the sole property of the company. The company
being a company for the "transmission of intelligence by electricity"
is by statute subject to the regulations and control of the public
-service commission, and may be nlade to serve the public, even
in its ticker service, without discrimination. The distribution of
market quotations by ticker service, when the company has acquired the quotations for itself, by purchase from the exchange or
by collection by its own agents on the floor of the exchange, is
evidently outside of its regular business as a carrier of messages
for hire, and it might be supposed that the same rules governing
the company as a sort of conmon carrier would not apply to the
case of an independent venture on its own account, such as this.
But the peculiar language of the Massachusetts statute evidently
covers the case in hand, and since the court holds that the transaction was a sale to the company, the contract cannot prevail against
the words of the statute. It would seem somewhat illogical to hold
that the exchange may communicate its information to others upon
whatever conditions it chooses, and then by legal proceedings compel the company to violate the condition upon which it receives
such information, and some cases have so held.':
But probably
the weight of authority sustains the view of the court, that when
you deal with a quasi-public corporation you subject your dealings
with it to its limitations as such a corporation.
The danger in the application of the principal laid down by
the court is the possibility of smoothing the way for bucket shop
proprietors. It was strenuously argued by counsel for the appellant that the only way to obviate this evil is to allow the exchange
to decide arhitrarilv who should or should not be a recipient of
service. And there is merit in the contention. As a practical matter the bucket shop prospers during an unsettled and varying market. A long, steady market is fatal to its success. It is settled
that neither a stock. exchange nor a telegraph company is obliged
"It was admitted in New York, etc., Exchange v. Board of Trade, supra.
note 9. that the Board of Trade had the right at any time to cease furnishing quotations altogether.

"Commercial Tel. Co. v. Smith, 47 Hun. 494 (N. Y. I888); In re
Renville. 46 App. Div. 37 (N. Y. 1899), specifically denying the application
of the doctrine of Munn v. Illinois to the stock exchange cases, and answering the reasoning in New York. etc.. Exchange v. Board of Trade. supra,
note 9: Wilson v. Commercial Tel. Co., 18 N. Y. S. R. 78; 3 N. Y. Supp.
633 (iMS); Sterrett v. Phila. Local Tel. Co., iS Phila. 316 (1886).
"Sterrett v. Phila. Local Tel. Co., supra, note ii; Bradley v. Western
Union Tel. Co., 8 Ohio Dec. (Reprint) 707 (183); In re Renville, supra,
note ii.
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to give ticker service to a bucket shop and that it is a reasonable
requirement to oblige an applicant to sign an agreement not to
conduct a bucket shop, 13 but the practical difficulty is to prove
that an applicant intends to conduct one, and the length of time
required to investigate and prove the fact that an apparently bonafitdc brokerage office is in reality a bucket shop. Two months of
an active market and the damage is done. The court ommeuting
on this argument says, "the accomplishment of a laudable result
does not justify the use of means condemned by a public board
acting in accordance with a legislative enactment."
The business of the country, and indeed of the whole world
under recent conditions, with all of its ramifications, has come to
depend on the activities of our various great exchanges and boards
of trade, to such an extent that they can no longer be regarded
as purely private associations of persons coming together for their
own convenience. The public's standard of values is determined
by their dealings and reports, they do have public duties and public
uses, and it is becoming more and more necessary that uniformity
of treatment in regard to them should be brought about. We
suggest federal incorporation and regulation as the best possible
solution tinder the circumstances.
T.L.H.
PROi'ERT -RULE AGAIN ST PERPETUITIES-PURPOSE AND APPLIc.rToIx-The Rule against Perpetuities, as it exists today
in the English and American systems of law, is the result of a
growth extending over a number of years, and having~its beginning
in comparatively modern times: that is. it is a branch of
the law which has arisen since the middle of the sixteenth century.
Prior to the Statute of Uses (1535),' and the Statute of Vills
(1540), there seems to have been no discussion as to remoteness, when related to the creation of estates and interests. This
was probably because there was no necessity for it in the
transactions of the day. True, in conveying realty, no fee simple
could be given to commence in futuro-but this was because of
the peculiar nature of livery of seisin. After the two statutes,
above referred to, a doctrine arose which laid down the rule that
there could not be a "possibility on a possibility."' The effect of"
"Board of Trade v. Christie, etc., Co., supra, note i: Stock Exchange
v. Board of Trade, 196 Ill.
396 (19o2); Board of Trade v. Celia Commission Co., sitpra, note 4: Sullivan v. Postal Tel. Co., 123 Fed. 41r, 6r
C. C. A. r (10o3): Illinois Commission Co. v. Cleveland Tel. Co., irg Fed.
3o (192o); Smith v. Western Union Tel. Co., 84 Ky. 664 (i887).
' 27 Hen. VIII, Chap. so.
232 Hen. VIII, Chap. i.

'Rector of Chedington's Case, i Co. x53a (Eng. 1598). by Lord Pop-
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this was to retard the idea involved in the Rule against Perpetuities1 The discussion of remoteness as related to the vesting
of estates seems to have first occurred in Child v. Baylie,l in the
argument of counsel; but was not considered in the decision of
the court." The basis of the' modern Rule was laid by Lord Nottingham in the Duke of Norfolk's Case 7-that the distance in time
was the test for the validity of a contingent interest;8 but that
time was then limited to lives in being at the death of a testator.
Then came the extension which included the life of the next taker
until he had reached his majority. It is curious to note that
while this seems to have been allowed as early as 1678," it was
not incontrovertibly settled until the case of Stephens v. Stephes.'0
The final step, allowing the limitation after the life in being, to
be a termn of twenty-one years in gross, without respect to the
infancy of any person whatever, was ratified in Cadell v. Palmer;"
although here, too, a much earlier decision 12 had been to the same
effect, without removing the question from the realm of doubt.
Some time previous to this last step, it had been decided that it
was a matter of no consequence. whether for a life, or lives, in
being at the creation of the interest."
It will thus be seen that
the Rule, as
it
exists
today,
in
its
entirety,
is less than one hundred
4

years old.2

What, then, is the Rule against Perpetuities and its purpose?
Perhaps the simplest statement is, that it is that rule which prevents the vesting of an interest !ater than twenty-one years (and
some months) after some life or lives in being at the creation of
'Although doubted in several later cases, this doctrine does not seem
to have been definitely overthrown till the Duke of Norfolk's Case, 3 Ch.
Cas. i (Eng. i68x).
'Cro. Jac. 459 (Eng. 1618).
'So in Pells v. Brown, Cro. Jac. 59o(Eng. 162o), the decision was
based on another point.
'Supra, note 4.
"Schaefer v. Schaefer, 141 Ill. 337 (1892); Smith's Appeal, 88 Pa. 492
('879).
'Taylor v. Biddal, 2 Mod. 289 (Eng. 1678).
'2 Barnard K. B. 375.(Eng. 1736).
121Cl. & F. 372 (Eng. 1832).
'Lloyd v. Carew. Prec. Ch. 72 (Eng. i698). This was a-House of
Lords' decision overruling the unanimous judgment, in which the Chancellor had taken part: but at the time there was only one law lord in the
House, which probably accounts for the fact that the decision had so
little weight. In America. the case of Barnitz v. Casey, 7 Cranch 456
(U. S. 1813). adopted the same view as to the twenty-one years being a
term in gross.
"Thelluson v. Woodford. ii Ves. 112 (Eng. i8o5). To the same effect
is Madison v. Farmon. 17o 111. 6s (1807).
"'For a very detailed account of the origin and growth of the Rule
against Perpetuities see Gray, Perpetuities (2d Ed.), Chap. V.
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the interest.'" This is a period which the law has fixed for the
creation of future estates and interests; and really contains in
itself the definition of a "perpetuity"-t at is, a future limitation
wblich is not to vest until after the expiration of, or which will
not necessarily vest within, that fixed period)" At one time there
was a prevailing idea that alienability was the test. by which a
perpetuity was to be judged:'- and indeed, it was the intrusion
of this idea, that caused a great deal of the difficulty" in dealing
with the subject. The purpose of the Rule is to prevent estates
or interests from being suspended for too long a time as to their
vesting. As soon as the interest vests, the Rule against Perpetuities no longer has any application. As a natural result of this, if
the interest is a vested one, it becomes unnecessary to consider the
Rule against Perpetuities at all-for : does not apply to vested
interests,"8 but to future contingent interests, of either a legal or
equitable nature. " Yet it should be noted that it is possible to
apply it to a vested interest in special cases, as where the exact
number of a class is not to be determined necessarily within twentyone years after a life in being. 0
With these principles in mind. the next question is as to the
method of application. Primarily it is a rule of law. rather than
of interpretation. The instrument concerned must first be construed, and then the court can consider whether the result secured
Put if the instrument is ambiguous, and
is subject to the Rule."
one interpretation would be void under the Rule, while the other
would be valid, it is then permissible to consider the Rule in arriving at a conclusion between the two possible views, and thus effectuate the intention of the maker if possible.22 Having reached the
point where the applicability of the Rule may be considered, this
is judged of, looking from the time of the creation of the hlmitation or power,2 and the circumstances then existing must be the
governing ones. In the case of a deed, the time of delivery is
"Gray, Perp., Sec.

2or.

"Ferguson v. Ferguson. 39 U. C. Q. B. 232 (Can. 1876); Waldo v.
Cumming, 45 l11.421 (1867): Phila. Y. Girard, 45 Pa. 9 (1863).
" Curtis v. Lukln. 5 Beav. 14 (Eng. 1842): Avern v. Lloyd, L R. 5
Eq. 383 (Eng. 1868): Barnum v. Barnum, 26 Md. 119 (1866).
" Farnam v. Farnam, 53 Conn. A6i (1885); Johnston's Estate, z85 Pa.
179 (1898); Gray, Perp., Sec. 2o5.
"Matter of Walkerly, io8 Cal. 6- (1895); How e v. Hodge, 152 IlL 252
(894) : Brattle Sq. Church v. Grant, 3 Gray 142 (Mass. 1855).
Gray, Perp, Sec. 2o5a.
Pearks v. Moseley. L. R. 5 App. Cas. 714 (Eng. i88o); In re Mervin,
L. R. 3 Ch. 197 (Eng. 189); Van Nostrand v. Moore. 52 N. Y. 12 (1873).
Martelli v. Holloway, L. R. 5 H. L. 532 (Eng. 1872); In re Turney, L.
R. 2 Ch. 739 (Eng. i8g): Du Bois v. Ray, 35 N. Y. 162 (1866).
" Thomas v. Gregg, 76 Md. 169 (1892).
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the starting point 24__in a will, the date of the testator's death.2 5
If in the instrument, the vesting depends on either of two contingencies, and by one of them, the gift would be good under the
Rule against Pr etuities, it is generally held that the fact that it

Yet it must be
would be bad utider the other, is inimaterial.2
observed that a case like this, should be distinguished from one
where the gift hinges on a single event, which may have two contingent parts, good under one, but not under the other-there, the
There are certain events, upon which the gift may
gift is void.2
he based, which have come to have a recognized effect in relation
to the
ule against Perpetuities. Thus, a limitation on a definite
failure of issue of one in being at the time the instrument takes
2
effect, or twenty-one years thereafter, is generally held good; 6
91
So a limitation
while if based on an indcfii,ite failure, it is bad.2
8
0
either in fee,' or for life, ' to the unborn child of a living person
is good; and the gift over on the death of the infant in the latter
case is good, if it can occur within twenty-one years of the death of
It is not possible to evade the Rule by the creation
the parent."
if the trust be for a recognized
though it is held that
of a trust,'
4
charity, the Rule does not apply.
That the question of vesting is the all-important one and the
first point of attack, is well illustrated by a recent case in Illinois.-I
There a fund was left in trust for thirty years, the income to be
paid to the testator's children; the principal to be paid them at the
Cooke v. Cooke, L. R. 38 Ch. D. 2o2 (Eng. 1887); Case v. Green,
78 Mich. 54o 0889).
-' Hale v. Hale, L. R. 3 Ch. 1). 643 (Eng. 876); McArthur v. Scott, i3
U. S. 34o (884); Hosea v. Jacobs, o8 Mass. 65 (1867); Hillen v. Iselin, 144
N. Y. 365 (1895).
"Evers v. Challis. 7 H. L. 531 (Eng. 1859); Halsey v. Goddard, 86 Fed.
25 (1898); Seaver v. Fitzgerald, 141 Mass. 401 (i886); Fowler v. Depau,
-6 Barb. 224 (X. Y. 1857).
"' In re Hancock, L. R. T Ch. 482 (Eng. iqoo).
'
r Lowman, L. R. 2 Ch. 348 (Eng. z895); Forman v. Troup, 30
Ga. 496 (i86o); Rapp v. Rapp, 6 Pa. 45 (1847).
'O'Mahoney v. Burdett. L. R. 7 H. L. 388 (Eng. 1874); James v.
Rowland, 52 Md. 462 (1879): Adams v. Farley, x8 So. 390 (Miss. 1895);
Davies v. Steele, 38 N. J. E. j68 (j884); Diehl v. King, 6 S. & R. 29
(Pa. 182).
In re Powell, L. R. i CIL 227 (Eng. 1898).
Routledge v. Dorril. 2 Ves. Jr.357 (Eng. T794) ; Owen's Petition, 3 Pa.
Dist. 328 (Phila. Co. I894).
' Stuart v. Cockerell, L R. 7 Eq. 363 (Eng. i869); Seaver v. Fitzgerald, supra, note 26.
'Bigelow v. Cady, 17r Il1. 229 (1897).
'Jones v. IHabersham, 1o7 U. S. 174 (1882); City of Richmond v. Davis,
1o3 Ind. 449 (j885) ; Phila. v. Girard, supra, note 16; The Apprentices' Fund
Case, 2 Pa. Dist. 435 (Phila. Co. i893).
'O'Hare v. Johnston, et al., 113 N. E. 127 (Ill. rx16).

NVOTES
end of the period named. Among the provisions was this, that if
either died leaving a child or children, they were to take the parent's share of the inc'ome. and at the expiration of the thirty years,
receive the principal. It was strongly argued that the ultimate
gift was contingent on the grandchildren surviving the thirty-year
period, and so too remote. But the court held that the gift of the
income was vested and that this vested in them the gift of principal. This conclusion was based on the language of the will, and
while in essence it was a mere question of construction, yet its
bearing on the question of the Rule against Perpetuities, was of
paramount importance. The distinction was made between that
state of facts, and those where the income is given to the children,
and the principal to the grandchildren, with a right to take their
parent's share of the income."- Being a vested interest, it was immaterial whether the holder of it had the right to possession and
enjoyment within the period allowed by the Rule.=
It can thus
be seen that while the Rule itself is clear and defined," its application raises questions, often of great difficulty, because of the
necessity of knowing whether the interest is vested or not; whether
it is for a charity or a mere private object of the maker's bounty ;3
and similar points.

TlRusP.Nss-PRwV.\TExY OWNE.D NV.%TER PIPE-LEAK FROM PIPE
INTO STRiE.T--"RY.ANDS V. FLETCIIER DOCTRhLE"-The rule in

Rylands v. Fletcher I has been covered so completely in the columns
of this magazine," that it would seem an affectation of learning
to advert to it further. But in a recent Pennsylvania Superior
Court decision,' a reference was made to it in a case presenting
such interesting aspects as to seem worthy of comment. A former
Kountz's Estate,
held contingent.
'

213

Pa.

39o

(0go6)-here

the gift of the principal was

Seaver v. Fitzgerald. suipra, note --6.

'As there are statutes in many states either defining or limiting the

rule. these should he consulted in order to note changes from the common
law. in the respective jurisdictions.
'Bates v. Bates, 134 Mass. T0 (883); Hartson v. Elden, So N. J. E.
522 (1892)-trusts for maintaining graves, or the like.
"The person who for his own purposes brings on his lands and collects and keeps there* anything likely to do mischief, if it escapes, must
keep it at his peril, and if he does not do so. is prima fade answerable for
all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape." L R. 3
H. of L- 330 (Eng. 1868).
'Article by John Marshall Gest on "The Natural Use of Land," in 33
A-MRFCA., LAW REGISTER i, "The Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher," by Francis H.
Bohlen, in 59 ANIeRmCAx L.'w REGISTER 298.

'Abraham, Appellant, v. Yardum. 64 Super. Ct. 225 (Pa. 1916).
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owner of premises now owned by the defendant in the cause had
laid a service pipe connecting with the water main, with the consent of tile municipal authorities. Water came through the sewer
into the cellars of the plaintiffs, abutting owners, and it was found
that a leak in the pipe had caused the earth under the sewer to
settle, so that it broke in that place. Defendant had no notice of
anyldefect in the water line or sewer. The court affirmed the decision of the trial judge giving binding instructions for defendants
on the ground that there was no evidence of any want of care on
the part of the defendants in relation to the water pipe, and that
they were not charged with any different degree of care from that
resting on the municipality or water company supplying residents
of the city with water. The court said, interalia, "The position taken
by the plaintiffs is that as soon as the leak occurred in the pipe a
nuisance was created and that the backing of the water through
the sewer had the effect to make the defendants trespassers and
therefore liable for all of the results of the leak in the pipe from
the time it gave way, in accordance with the broad principle announced in Rylinds v. Fletcher." It then states that the effect of
the application of the doctrine would make even an innocent person
bear the responsibility of an insurer, discussing the English cases
bearing on the principle and exceptions to the rule, saying that it
had been repudiated by the Sanderson case' in Pennsylvania.
It is to be observed that the principle in Rjlands v. Fletcher
does not need to be invoked as a ground for liability where either
trespass or nuisance is shown, since in that case there was neither
any direct invasion of the plaintiff's premises or such a continuously injurious" condition interfering with a neighbor's power of
control or enjoyment of that lroperty as to create a technical
ni..ance.1 Therefore the question whether the rule is. in force
in Pennsylvania is immaterial to the question of nuisance or no
nuisance involved in the case at hand. We must remember, however. that the court's observations referred to in the Sanderson
case were by way of dicta, they not regarding Rylands v. Fletcher
"as having any application" since nothing had been brought upon
the land bv the mine owners, and that in this commonwealth the
doctrine of Coal Co. v. Sanderson has been confined to its own
In fact, in one case, the court doubted the appliparticullar facts.
cation of the doctrine to the accumulation of sulphur water in an
abandoned mine, tapped and released to secure coal thereon, and
laid hold of the fact of coal dirt increasing the sulphur water thus
released to hold the coal company liable for the polhtion of a
4Sanderson v. Coal Co.. 113 Pa. 1-6 (i886). where the pumping of mine
water from a coal mine, finding its way to a stream, was held to be a
natural use of land of which a lower riparian owner had no legal cause of
complaint.
*1Pollock Rw,.'y. v. London, -6 S. E. 3o6 (1912).
'6. U. OF PA. LTAw REvifW. p. 310.

NOTES
well by percolation.7 It does not clearly appear from the record
whether, or not, the injurious condition complained of arose during
the occupation of the previous owner, but since a purchaser in
possession is not liable for a nuisance created by the party preceding him in enjoyment of the premises until notice of its existence has been given him and he has been afforded a reasonable time in which to abate it.' there could have been no ground
for the dissenting opinion holding defendant liable for maintaining
a nuisance, and the condition must be taken to have originated
while defendant was in possession. In that opinion the case is
deemed within the rule of Hauck v. Pipe Line Co.,9 where the
plaintiff introduced evidence to show that oil escaped from defendant's pipes, percolated through the ground and injured his springs
and lands. Though there was no evidence of negligence, its liabilitv followed. It is fundamental that where a continuous wrongful condition exists doing harm to the lands of one's neighbor,
negligence need not be alleged or proved."0
But where the plaintiff alleges negligence, the law imposes
upon him the burden of proving the averment, although it may not
have been essential to the cause of action." This principle is clearly
shown in the cases 12 cited in the majority opinion in support of
the freedom from liability on the part of the defendant householder,
all of which, it is true, turned on the question of negligence on the
part of a municipality, gas or water company, in the construction or
maintenance of its pipes; but they were all tried on the theory of
negligence, in which event, it is patent that negligence would have
to be shown to afford a ground for liability. No court, it is subMitted, would go out of its way to hold a party liable on the ground
of nuisance when they could follow the line of least resistance by
making him pay for his want of care. These cases do not establish the proposition that a gas or water company is not liable for
nuisance; and even a corporation vested with the powers of eminent domain is responsible for injuries done to residential properties from smoke, gases. etc., thrown upon them on the ground of
nuisance,' though in that case a trespass was also involved as in
'Stevenson v. Ebervale Coal Co., 2o Pa. it6 (19o2).
'Glenn v. Crescent Coal Co., 140 S. W. 42 (Ky. 1911); Beauchamp v.
Excelsior Brick Co., 127 N. Y. S. 686 (19ji).
'Hauck v. Tidewater 'Pipe Line Co., 151 Pa. 366 (7893).
" Stokes v. P. R. R.. 214 Pa. 415 (igo6); Vautier v. Atlantic Refining
Co.. 231 Pa. 8 O91).
"City of Montgomery v. Stephens. 69 So. 97o (Alabama 1915).
"Kibele v. Phila.. 1o5 Pa. 41 (1884); Koelsch v. -Phila., 152 Pa. 353
(1893) : Rumsey v. Phila.. i7i Pa. 63 (1895): T-eh v. Consolidated Gas Co.,
2o Pa. 443 (062): Hartman v. Citizens Gas Co.. 21o Pa. i9 (io4); Shirey
v. Gas Co., 215 Pa. 319 (i9o6): Morgan v. Duquesne Borough. -9 Super.
Ct. oo (Pa. 19o5).
" Sproson v. P. & R., 54 Superior Court 30 (1913).
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the case of a quarry owner, blasting on his premises, casting rocks
onto adjoining land."' It is further to be observed that most of
the cases cited, supra, were cases of explosions-no continuous condition, hence, no nuisance and no trespass, since the gas company
had authority to lay its pipes where placed, and therefore cases in
which the rule of Rylands v. Fletcher would have to be invoked
to render the company liable. But even the English courts refusedn
to apply the rule to corporations acting under statutory authority,"
aliter, however, in the case of a gas company creating a nuisance,
i.e., pipes leaking so as to contaminate water in pipes laid under
0
same highway close to the gas pipe." The court said: "'The dedown pipes and were required
lay
to
power
fendants had statutory
to supply gas to houses situated within a certain distance of their
mains, but had no statutory power to create a nuisance." But in
any event the defendants in our principal case can not invoke the
protection of any statutory authority, and the question presents
itself with compelling force, what is the difference between the
trickliig of water 18in the Yardurn Case " and the seepage of oil in
the pipe line case.
It is submitted that the facts of the case do not bring it within
the principle of Rylands v. Fletcher.9 "Itis not every use to which
land is put that brings into play that principle," 21 said an English
court. "It must be some special use bringing with it increased
danger to others; and must not merely be the ordinary use of the
land or such a use as is proper for the general benefit of the community. The provision of a proper supply of water to the various
parts of a house is not only reasonable but has become, in accordance with modern sanitary views, an almost necessary feature of town life. It is now recognized as being so desirable in
"Muchanock v. Cement Co., 98 Atl. 5S4 (Pa. i916), cited in article
referred to in note 6, supra.
(Eng. 1895).
,S
Price v. Metropolitan Gas Co.. 6i L. J. Q. B. i_-6
" Batchellor v.Tunbridge Wells Co., i7T. 1- R. 577 (Eng. igoi).
" See note 3, supra.
"See note 4,supra.

"McCord

Rubber Co. v. St. Joe Water Co, i8t Mo. 6g4 (9o4),

where the court says, "There is a wide difference between a great volume
of water collected in a reservoir in dangerous proximity to the premises
of another and water brought into a house through pipes in the manner
usual in all cities for the ordinary use of the occupants of the house. Whilst
water so brought into a house can not literally be said to have come in in
the course of what might be called in the language above quoted of the Lord
Chancellor 'natural user of the premises,' yet it is brought in by the method
universally in use in cities and is not to be treated as an unnatural gathering
of a dangerous agent." To the same effect, see Blake v. Land Corporation,
3 T. L R. 667 t Eng. 1887). holding that water in a cistern was not on
the same footing with water in a reservoir, since it was "the ordinary
domestic apparatus that was in every house."
' Richards v. Lothian. A. C. -"63 (Eng. 1913).
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the interests of community that it is usually made obligatory in
civilized countries. Such a supply can not be installed without
causing some concurrent danger of leakage or overflow. It would
be unreasonable for the law to regard those who instal or maintain
such a system of supply as doing so at their own peril, with an
absolute liability for any damage from its presence even where
If having on his premises such
there has been no negligence.
means of supply he is only using those premises in any ordinary
and proper manner, although he is bound to exercise all reasonable
care. he is not responsible for damage not due to his own default.
whether that damage be caused by inevitable accident or wrongful
acts of third persons." In the light of these cases, 1.ad the learned
Pennsylvania judge cared to extend the doctrine of "a natural
user" of the land. expressed in the Sanderson case. supra. to one
residential in its character and common to individuals living in
cities, his decision would have had the undoubted sanction of authoritV 21 and the attempted 'distinction between various forns of
nuisance would have been rendered unnecessary.

C. B. IV.
Sulton v. Card, W. M. 120 (Eng. 1886), where the court said. "there
is a wide difference between permitting water which a man has himself
fouled to flow into his neighbour's premises and the leakage of fair water
from a supply pipe being the ordinary way of using a man's own property.
Damage arising from the latter source is dainnum sine injztria." See also
Blake v. Worlf. 2 Q. B. 426 (Eng. 88), where the use of a cistern was
held to be reasonable user of house and the escape of water from it did
not impose liability upon the owner in the absence of negligence. .

